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This paper uses an endogenous merger formation approach in a concentrated 
international oligopoly to examine the effects of trade liberalization on the nature of 
merger incentives (national vs. international). The effects of unilateral trade 
liberalization on a country’s industry structure are found to be depending on the other 
country’s trade policy regime. If the other country practices free trade, unilateral 
liberalization by a country yields international mergers whereas if it practices a 
restrictive trade policy, national mergers arise. As trade gets bilaterally liberalized, the 
resulting equilibrium market structure is the one with international mergers. These 
results fit well with the fact that global trade liberalization has been accompanied by an 
increase in international merger activity. Among equilibrium market structures, 
international ones are found to be preferable from a welfare point of view. As a result, 
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Over the last two decades, the world economy has experienced a large wave of 
mergers. One particular characteristic of this merger wave is the high incidence of cross-
border mergers and acquisitions (M&A's). In fact, international mergers and corporate 
take-overs have become an important vehicle for foreign direct investment (FDI) flows 
between developed countries. Cross-border merger activity involving developing 
countries, although quite small by the standards of developed ones, has also greatly 
expanded during the last fifteen years.
1 Today, cross-border M&A's constitute the 
dominant form of FDI with profound effects on international industry structure.
2 Despite 
the increase in cross-border M&A's, the literature on international trade and FDI has paid 
little attention to this phenomenon.
3 Instead, the focus has been the international location
                                                 
1 UNCTAD (1999) carried out a more detailed analysis of the incidence of cross-border M&A's in 
developing countries. It found that the share of M&A's in the accumulated FDI rises from 22% on average 
during 1988-91 to 72% during 1992-97 (China is excluded). 
 
2 An interesting feature of the current wave of cross-border M&A's is that it is truly international, as 
opposed to the previous waves, which involved primarily U.S. firms. Measured by dollar value, takeovers 
involving at least one U.S. party have declined from 88% worldwide in 1985 to 53% in 1999. 
Consequently, it no longer makes sense to see takeover booms and busts as national phenomena. 
 
3 Markusen (1995) surveyed the theoretical literature on FDI and multinational enterprises (MNE). This 
literature includes papers by Dunning (1977), Markusen (1984), Horstmann and Markusen (1992), 
Markusen and Venables (1995).  2
decisions of firms. In this literature, firms typically face a trade-off between the fixed cost 
of an additional plant in the export market and the benefit of economizing on tariffs and 
trade costs.
4 The present paper investigates the link between trade costs and merger 
incentives in an international oligopoly.
5 To this end, key motivating questions are: What 
are the effects of unilateral and bilateral trade liberalization on the nature of mergers 
(national or international) that emerges in equilibrium? What types of mergers (national 
or international) are preferred from a welfare point of view? If countries respond to 
mergers with optimal trade policy, which industry structures arise in equilibrium? 
We consider a minimal symmetric oligopolistic industry in which firms sell 
differentiated goods in two segmented markets (home and foreign). The interaction takes 
place in two stages. In the first stage, industry structure is determined: firms decide 
whether to merge domestically, internationally or stay as competing units. In the second 
stage, firms compete in prices.
6 In determining industry structure, we employ the 
approach of endogenous merger formation developed by Horn and Persson (2001). An 
important feature of the model is that the origin of firms is crucial. If asset owners from 
different countries merge, the resulting firm is an international firm that has the 
advantage of avoiding tariff levels in both markets. By contrast, national firms face a 
tariff disadvantage when exporting. 
                                                 
4 Linkages between trade policy regime and FDI go back to Bhagwati (1973). See Konishi, Saggi, and 
Weber (1999) as a recent example of this line of research. 
 
5 Over the same period, the average tariff rates in the world, especially in manufacturing industries, have 
been substantially reduced during trade negotiations undertaken within the World Trade Organization. 
 
6 Unlike much of the literature on mergers in international markets, we follow Davidson and Deneckere's 
(1985) approach and utilize price competition in the product market. Since Salant et. al. (1983) it is well 
known that under quantity competition, firms can actually lose from a merger since the merged unit loses 
market share to outside firms. 
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We explore firms' incentives to form cross-border mergers under non-prohibitive 
tariff levels and show that two effects play an important role in merger formation: 
protection gain and tariff savings. The first effect represents the anti-competitive impact 
of trade policy and it arises when firms are national units. The tariff savings effect simply 
captures the incentive to avoid the trade cost by merging with a firm in the export market. 
An analysis of these two effects shows that the tariff level and the degree of product 
differentiation together create a trade-off between the relative attractiveness of national 
and international market structures. If the trade environment is restrictive, and the 
industry produces close substitutes, the former effect dominates the latter generating a 
tendency for national mergers. On the other hand, when the trade environment is close to 
free trade, the tariff savings dominates the protection gain and this dominance is stronger 
for highly differentiated products.  
Next, we examine the implications of unilateral home trade liberalization at two 
extreme foreign tariff levels (prohibitive foreign tariff and zero tariff). We find that when 
products are close substitutes, different trade policy regimes in the foreign country can 
reverse the effects of unilateral home trade liberalization. When the foreign country 
practices free trade, unilateral home trade liberalization induces firms to form 
international mergers. However, when the foreign tariff is prohibitive, the impact of 
unilateral home trade liberalization depends on the degree of product differentiation: for 
highly differentiated products, the equilibrium market structure is international whereas 
for close substitutes, it is national. This result stems from the fact that, when there is 
severe competition among firms (i.e. when the degree of product differentiation is low), a 
highly protective trade policy regime in one country creates an incentive to merge  4
nationally rather than internationally since the protection gain is more important than the 
tariff savings in determining industry structure. 
Given the effects of unilateral trade liberalization, it is natural to ask: What are the 
effects of bilateral trade liberalization on industry structure? This interaction is examined 
by assuming a common exogenous tariff level in both markets and then lowering it. In 
contrast to unilateral trade liberalization, the tariff reduction is realized in both markets so 
that both the tariff savings and the protection gain from tariffs declines. Our main result 
here is that, as trade gets bilaterally liberalized, the resulting equilibrium market structure 
is the one with international mergers. This result is consistent with the fact that global 
trade liberalization has been accompanied by an increase in cross-border merger 
activities. It is important to note that equilibrium market structures following unilateral 
and bilateral trade liberalization seem to provide the opposite intuition to the tariff 
jumping argument in the FDI literature where high tariffs create an incentive for FDI. 
This contrast is mainly due to the endogeneity of the merger formation in our model. 
Here, FDI can occur only via an international merger whereas the tariff jumping 
argument is typically made for a single firm under trade policy regime by comparing two 
discrete options: Export versus Greenfield entry. 
What if countries can respond to changes in market structure via optimal tariffs? 
Endogenous trade policy is allowed in order to study equilibrium market structures and 
their welfare properties under optimal tariffs. It is found that as the market gets more 
concentrated nationally, each country imposes a higher tariff on imports whereas if the 
market gets more concentrated internationally, a country's optimal tariff actually declines. 
In the empirical literature, the effect of the industry concentration on the level of  5
protection is inconclusive. This result provides an alternative explanation for this 
ambiguity. Furthermore, the equilibrium market structure is the one with concentrated 
international mergers when products are highly differentiated whereas national mergers 
arise for close substitutes. 
Turning to welfare, three effects are shown to be important in determining 
preferred market structures from a welfare point of view. The first two effects are the 
standard anti-competitive effects of tariffs and market concentration on consumer welfare 
and producer surplus. The third effect is the free rider effect, which arises under 
asymmetric market structures. It can be measured by the amount by which the profits of a 
non-merging firm increase when a merger happens. We find that, for lower tariffs, the 
market structure with no mergers is the welfare champion when product substitutability is 
low. When trade policy is not restrictive, the main welfare concern is the anti-competitive 
effect of market concentration on consumer welfare. When products are close substitutes, 
there is severe competition among firms so that the free rider effect of a foreign merger to 
home competing firms tips the balance in favor of the triopoly with a foreign merger. As 
the tariff level increases, the tariff saving feature of international mergers becomes 
important and international mergers are preferred market structures from a welfare point 
of view since international firms can avoid trade costs but national firms cannot. 
Among equilibrium market structures, international market structures represent 
higher welfare than the national ones. This result provides support for the idea that there 
is scope for welfare-enhancing merger policies under a liberal trade environment. 
Interpreting merger policy as the choice of degree of industrial concentration, we show  6
that social and private incentives become aligned together as trade gets bilaterally 
liberalized. 
Our paper is related to Horn and Persson (2001) who apply the endogenous 
merger formation approach to international trade and determine the equilibrium 
ownership structure of an international oligopoly. They show that the international 
pattern of ownership depends on trade and production costs. However, while 
investigating the effects of trade costs on the equilibrium ownership structures, they do 
not exclude prohibitive trade cost levels. This feature results in national ownership 
structures mainly due to the monopoly power in the domestic market. If we squeeze their 
results to the region of non-prohibitive trade-cost levels, the only surviving equilibrium 
market structure is the one with international mergers.
7 In this paper, however, we argue 
that concentrated national market structure can be the equilibrium one even under non-
prohibitive tariff levels. Moreover, if the trade cost is interpreted as the tariff level, the 
equilibrium characterization in Horn and Persson (2001) indicates that bilateral trade 
liberalization results in an empty set of market structures (i.e. there is no equilibrium). 
This paper shows that the choice of price as a basic strategic variable instead of 
quantity overcomes the non-existence problem, which arises as trade liberalization 
occurs. Under price competition with differentiated products, we find that unilateral and 
bilateral trade liberalization results in a non-empty equilibrium market structures. This 
                                                 
7 Under Cournot competition, national mergers are never equilibrium candidates. Since Salant et. al. 
(1983), it has been well known that, under quantity competition, unless the merged unit achieves very high 
market share, merging firms can actually lose from a merger. As a result, the main comparison leading to 
equilibrium market structure is between the market structure with international mergers and the one with no 
merger. 
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result stems from the fact that under price competition, every single merger is profitable 
and there is no trivial elimination of concentrated market structures. 
Brief mention must be made on the related line of research, which explores 
profitability of mergers, regulation issues, and the interaction between merger policies 
and trade liberalization. Examples of this line of research are: Barros and Cabral (1994), 
Collie (2002), Cowan (1989), Head and Ries (1997), Farrel and Shapiro (1990), Horn and 
Levinsohn (2001), Richardson (1999), and Saggi and Yildiz (2002). Unlike the present 
paper, this research uses the traditional criterion for merger incentives. 
The essay is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces an endogenous merger 
formation model in a concentrated international oligopoly with differentiated products. 
The model is employed in Section 3 to determine the equilibrium market structure 
characterization following unilateral and bilateral trade liberalization. The welfare 
implications of trade liberalization and optimal merger policy are discussed in section 4. 
In Section 5, endogenous trade policy is allowed. Concluding discussion will follow in 
Section 6. Finally, most of the calculations and proofs can be found in the appendix. 
 
2. The Model 
The model is a two-country partial equilibrium set-up in which countries are 
indexed by k, where k =h (home country), f (foreign country). Countries are identical 
with respect to market size and demand. In each exporting country, there is a single 
industry consisting of two firms that produce symmetrically differentiated products. Each 
firm is endowed with one unit of an indivisible asset assumed to be fixed in supply. Firms 
are indexed by i= 1, 2, 3, 4 where 1 and 2 (3 and 4) denote home (foreign) firms and their  8
assets are located in home country and foreign country respectively. Firms own the 
exclusive technology for their particular brand and the marginal cost of production for all 
firms is constant (c≥0). 
The interaction takes place in two stages. In the first stage, industry structure is 
determined: firms decide whether to merge domestically, internationally or stay as 
competing units. In the second stage, firms formed in the first stage compete non-
cooperatively in Bertrand fashion in two countries' markets. 
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where  i p  is the price charged by firm i and  i q  its sales and N denotes the number 
of firms in the market. The parameter  0 ≥ γ  is a measure of the substitutability of the 
goods. When γ  approaches zero, goods become unrelated and as it approaches infinity, 
goods become perfect substitutes. Note that the degree of product differentiation between 
any two goods is the same. 
The effect of trade liberalization on the equilibrium market structure can be 
examined by assuming exogenous tariff levels faced by exporting firms and then 
lowering those tariffs. Given these tariff levels, the origin of merging firms becomes 
crucial. If asset owners from different countries merge, the resulting firm is an 
international firm having the advantage of avoiding tariff levels in both markets. By 
contrast, national firms (either non merged units or constructed by merging owners from  9
the same country) have trade protection in their own country but face a tariff 
disadvantage when exporting. Throughout the paper, we exclude prohibitive tariff levels 
since such tariffs are rarely witnessed under trade environment. 
Since markets are segmented, firms' decisions concerning one market do not 
affect their decisions in other markets. We first take the industry structure as given and 
analyze the product market equilibrium (second stage of the game) for home firms. 
Similar optimization procedures apply for foreign firms. We denote the tariff levels in the 
home and foreign country by  h t and  f t  respectively. 
In fully decentralized market structure (no mergers), each non-merging home firm 
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where i =1, 2 
When merging, firms are allowed to shut down the operation of some plants, but 
may not alter the characteristics of their products. Each nationally merging home firm in 
its own market solves the following problem: 
                                                 
8 In our computations we assume that 0 = c . This is without loss of generality, as we can always transform 
variables as follows: c − =α α
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The tariff cost can be avoided by merging with local producers in the export 
market. Thus, internationally merged firms (for example: firm 1 and firm 3) solve the 










- ( - - (
4
1
= ) ,..., ( max
3 1
j i i i p p
p p p p p p γ α π                   (2.6)     
Thus far, we have taken the industry structure as given. We now turn to the first 
stage of interaction. In determining industry structure, there are several modeling choices. 
The traditional merger literature considers mergers between exogenously chosen groups 
of firms. The criterion for merger incentives in this literature focuses on two market 
structures where one is a strict concentration of the other. Firms are said to have 
incentives to merge if the profits of the merged unit is higher than the combined pre-
merger profits of merging units. However it does not seem reasonable when there is a 
ranking structure, which involves many feasible market structures some of which are not 
strict concentration of others. To deal with this problem, there are two main alternative 
approaches to endogenize merger formation.
9 
                                                 
9 Chatterjee et al. (1993) and Ray and Vohra (1998) treat the merger formation as a non-cooperative 
bargaining game and also belong to in this literature. 
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First, Kamien and Zang (1990) offered an acquisition process modeled as follows: 
Each owner makes offers or bids for every other firm and announces an asking price for 
her own simultaneously. Equilibrium market structure is determined following a general 
allocation scheme once all bids and asking prices are known. Simultaneity of the bidding 
process implies that there are no negotiations between firms. This approach applies to 
situations where there are many firms and owners. In contrast, our focus is on minimal 
symmetric oligopoly model where firms are able to communicate and sign binding 
contracts. 
Our model is built on the endogenous merger formation approach developed by 
Horn and Persson (2001). Based upon the earlier literature on mergers, and on actual 
observations of firm behavior, they take the view that merger formation can be treated as 
a cooperative game since parties involved in the formation process are free to 
communicate and sign binding contracts.
10 This approach is a generalization of traditional 
merger analysis since comparisons are made between all feasible market structures rather 
than two exogenously given market structures one of which is a strict concentration of the 
other. 
In this model, an important concept is the dominance relation, which implies that 
if a market structure 
j M  is dominated by another market structure
i M , the former will 
not be the outcome of the merger formation since it is in the interest of firms who have 
the power of enforcing 
i M over
j M . These firms are called to be "decisive firms" and 
                                                 
10 Ray and Vohra (1998) portray the merger formation as a non-cooperative extensive form bargaining 
game. In their model, market structure and payoff distribution are simultaneously determined. The 
prediction about which mergers are formed is highly sensitive to the order of offers and counter-offers. 
However, the present model indicates that, if any binding agreement can be renegotiated, this sensitivity 
problem vanishes. 
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they are directly involved in the process of merger formation and break-up.
11 Two 
assumptions are made in the merger formation process. First, any payments between 
coalitions are not allowed. Second, when forming a merger, participating firms can 
choose any payoff distribution among themselves subject to the constraint that the total 
payoff distributed be exactly equal to the merged unit's total profit in the second stage of 
the game. 
The idea behind this concept can be seen more clearly in the following example in 
which there are four firms and four market structures:  }} 4 { }, 3 { }, 12 {{ =
A M , 
}} 4 { }, 2 }{ 13 {{ =
B M , }} 4 { }, 3 { }, 2 { }, 1 {{ =
C M , and  }} 34 { }, 12 {{ =
D M . First consider 
the first two market structures. Firm 4 does not change its behavior in 
A M  and 
B M  in 
the sense that it stays as a competing unit in both structures. Since payments between 
firms are not allowed, firm 4 cannot influence the ranking of market structures
A M  
and
B M . Alternatively stated, firm 4 is not "decisive" with respect to these two market 
structures. Now turn to firms 1, 2, and 3. If the market structure 
A M  is formed, firm 3 
will not participate in any merger. In order to prevent this, if firm 3's profit is higher 
under
B M , it may offer to firm 1 a larger share of payoff of the merger under the market 
structure
B M . On the other hand, firm 2 may make a counter-offer to induce a merger 
with firm 1 if its profit is higher under
A M . As a result, by being linked to firm 1 in the 
market structure
B M , firm 3 is able to bargain with firm 2 over firm 1's participation in a 
merger. This bargaining process implies that firms 1, 2, and 3 have the ability to affect 
                                                 
11 Formal definition of a decisive group and further detailed discussion can be found in Horn and Persson 
(2001).  13
the ranking of market structures 
A M  and
B M . Therefore, these firms are "decisive" with 
respect to these two market structures. 
Decisive firms can be redefined as follows: except for the firms belonging to the 
same coalitions in two different market structures, all remaining firms are decisive. Note 
that there may be more than one group of decisive firms. Consider now the ranking of 
last two market structures 
C M  and
D M . Firms 1 and 2 participate in a merger under 
D M  
as do firms 3 and 4 even though they are competing units under
C M . Therefore all four 
firms are decisive with respect to these two market structures. However, merger 
formation processes are not linked so that there are two decisive groups of firms. The first 
decisive group is composed of firm 1 and firm 2 and the second one includes firm 3 and 
firm 4. As in Horn and Persson (2001), the decisive group of owners with respect to two 
different market structures 
i M and
j M  will be denoted as 
j i
g D
&  where g represents the 
number of the group of decisive firms. 
Given the definition of the concept of decisive firms, dominance relations work as 
follows: If there is only one decisive group of firms between two market structures 
i M and
j M , 
i M  dominates 
j M  if and only if the combined profit of the decisive group 
j i D
&  is larger in 
i M  than
j M . If there are two decisive groups of firms, it is required 
that domination holds for each of them. It is important to note that the dominance relation 
is not transitive if decisive group(s) of firms is (are) not the same. In other words, in the 
above example, if 
A M  dominates 
B M and 
B M  dominates
C M , one can not infer that 
A M  dominates
C M since decisive firms with respect to 
A M  and 
B M  are not the same as 
decisive firms with respect to 
B M  and
C M  (
A M  and 
C M ). Furthermore, it is clear that  14
i M and
j M  cannot dominate each other simultaneously. As a result, the dominance 
relation is asymmetric. 
Having identified the decisive firms and described how we rank any pair of 
market structures using dominance relation, the next question is: How can we find the 
equilibrium market structure? An equilibrium market structure is defined to be the one 
that is undominated by any other feasible market structure. The model has the feature that 
firms merge all the way to monopoly, if permitted. This is because the combined profits 
of all firms in other market structures are smaller than monopoly profits and all parties 
are involved in the merger formation process. Since the focus is on the distinction 
between national and international mergers, highly concentrated market structures 
(monopoly and the duopoly with international merger of three firms) will be excluded 
within the equilibrium market structures.
12  
The symmetry of the model indicates that there are 10 possible ownership 
structures that can be represented by 5 market structures:
13 
1-  ) Fully Decentralized Market structure (No mergers):  
{4}} {3}, {2}, {{1}, =
O M  
2- ) Triopolies with one national merger:  
{4}} {3}, {{12}, =
H M  ,  {34}} {2}, {{1}, =
F M  
 
                                                 
12 We can rule out these market structures simply by assuming that the competition authority sets a 
maximum of Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) level. Since HHI is a convex function of shares, it 
increases both as the number of firms in the market decreases and as the disparity in size between those 
firms increases. Using this feature of HHI, duopoly with international merger of three firms can be 
differentiated from duopoly with two mergers of equal size. 
 
13 This approach follows the partition function form games developed by Thrall and Lucas (1963). 
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I M {24}} {3}, {{1},
1
4 =
I M  
4- ) The duopoly with two national mergers:  
{34}} 12}, {{ =
N M  
5- ) Duopolies with two international mergers (
I M ):  
{24}} {{13}, =
I
a M {23}} {{14}, =
I
b M  
In order to save on notation, later on in this paper, each market structure is 
referred to its first ownership structure as far as this is possible. 
In order to capture the seemingly complicated dominance relation, consider the 
following example. For market structure 
I M  to dominate
H M  , firm 1 and firm 2 should 
be able to convince firm 3 and firm 4 respectively to merge with them internationally. It 
implies that the profit gain for firm 1 and firm 2 should be enough to cover any possible 
loss of firm 3 and firm 4. Furthermore, firm 1 and firm 2 have to make sure that they will 
earn more profits by breaking up a national merger and moving to the market structure 
with two international mergers. These conditions can be captured by following 
inequalities:  
 
I H H I M M M M
3 3 1 1 π π π π − > −                                           (2.7) 
I H H I M M M M
4 4 2 2 π π π π − > −                                           (2.8) 
Addition of (3.7) and (3.8) and rearrangement yield that all firms are decisive and 
combined profit of the decisive group 
H I D
&  is larger in 
I M  than in 
H M  for market  16
structure 
I M  to dominate
H M : 
 
 
I M  dominates 
H M  iff 
H H H H I I I I M M M M M M M M
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 π π π π π π π π + + + > + + +   (2.9) 
The following decisive groups are relevant for the comparison of the market 
structures defined above: 
A-) no mergers & triopolies with one national merger: one decisive group 
comprising two owners: 
H O D
& = {1, 2}, 
F O D
& = {3, 4} 




1 & = {1, 3} 




1 = {1, 2}, 
N O D
&
2 = {3, 4} 
D-) no mergers & duopolies with two international mergers: two symmetric 




1 = {1, 3}, 
I O D
&
2 = {2, 4} 
E-) triopolies with one national merger & triopolies with one international 
merger: one decisive group comprising three owners: 
I H D
1 & = {1, 2, 3}, 
I F D
1 & = {1, 3, 4} 
                                                 




15 Note that {13, 24} is taken as a representative ownership structure for
I M . 
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F-) triopolies with one national merger & duopoly with two national mergers: one 
decisive group comprising two owners: 
N H D
& = {3, 4}, 
N F D
& = {1, 2} 
G-) triopolies with one national merger & duopolies with two international 




& = {1, 2, 3, 4} 
H-) triopolies with one international merger & duopoly with two national 
mergers: one decisive group comprising all owners: 
N I D
& 1 = {1, 2, 3, 4} 
I-) triopolies with one international merger & duopolies with two international 
mergers: one decisive group comprising two owners: 
I I D
& 1 = {2, 4} 
J-) duopoly with two national mergers & duopolies with two international 
mergers: one decisive group comprising all owners: 
I N D
& = {1, 2, 3, 4} 
 
3. Results: Trade Liberalization and Equilibrium Market Structures 
Our aim is to identify the effects of unilateral and bilateral trade liberalization on 
the equilibrium market structure in a concentrated international oligopolistic market. 
Therefore, we exclude prohibitive tariff levels in the following corollary to highlight how 
the incentives to form national and international mergers are influenced by tariff levels. 
Basically, we examine a situation where countries cannot shut out their markets in any 
market structure.  18
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where subscripts (h for home country, f for foreign country) of t represents the country in 
which tariff is imposed while superscript denotes the market structure. 
 
Note that for symmetric market structures (
I O M M
1 ,,  a n d
N M ) there is no need 
for a subscript. As it is seen clearly from the above ranking structure, the same 
concentration level of importing firms results in the same prohibitive tariff level 
irrespective of domestic concentration. Moreover, the duopoly with two international 
mergers inherently eliminates tariff protection. Hereafter 
I t
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3.1. Unilateral Trade Liberalization 
Here, we examine the effect of unilateral trade liberalization by assuming 
exogenous tariff levels ( h t  and  f t ) faced by exporting firms in both markets, and then 
lowering one of the tariff levels keeping the other unchanged.
16 To this end, a function 
called relative gain from international mergers ( (.) g
j & I ) is defined as the difference of the 
                                                 
16 As it is indicated in the introduction, only unilateral home trade liberalization is examined. Due to 
symmetry, same results will apply to the case of unilateral foreign trade liberalization. 
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combined profit of the decisive firms between the duopoly with two international mergers 
(
I M ) and any other market structures compared with it. Using results from traditional 
criterion for merger incentives, it is well known that merger profitability increases with 
merger size. Therefore, our focus will be on concentrated market structures. Given the 
tariff saving assumption, the comparison of duopoly with two international mergers 
(
I M ) with other market structures is taken as a base scenario. The relative gain from 
international mergers ( (.) g
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j & I π π                          (3.11) 
where j represents market structures other than
I M . 
Since the combined profits of the decisive firms under 
I M are not affected by any 
change in the tariff levels, we need to focus on the combined profit of the decisive firms 
under other market structures compared with
I M . In these comparisons, in each decisive 
group (if there is more than one), there is an equal number of decisive firms either 
protected for or against with home tariffs. Given this fact, we need to identify the 
decisive forces in the merger formation process. 
 
3.1.1. Role of Trade Protection and Tariff Saving 
There are two counteracting effects in the merger formation stage of the game. 
First of them is the protection gain which represents the anti-competitive impact of the 
trade policy. This effect arises when firms are formed as national units. The second effect  20
is the tariff savings that creates incentives to merge internationally in order to avoid 
tariffs in the export market. 
In order to capture the idea behind these two effects, consider the dominance 
function with respect to international duopoly (
I M ) and national duopoly (
N M ). As 
noted above, there is only one decisive group composed of all four firms with respect to 
these two market structures. Therefore, industry profit levels are compared under these 
market structures. It is obvious that the industry profit under international duopoly (
I M ) 
does not depend on home and foreign tariffs ( h t  and  f t  respectively) since firms avoid 
tariffs by merging internationally, whereas the tariff level affects industry profit under the 
national duopoly (
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where 
e q12represents the amount of output exported by a home merger. 
First term in (3.13) represents the home merger's profit in the absence of home 
and foreign tariffs. The second and third terms measure the change in the home merger's 
aggregate profits net of tariff payment relative to a situation in which both countries 
                                                 
17 Naturally, aggregate profits are the same when  h t =  f t =0.  21
practice free trade ) 0 ( = = f h t t . It stems from the fact that the tariff protection leads to an 
increase in the home and foreign merger's price level. The foreign price level exceeds the 
home price level since the home merger's reaction function has a slope uniformly less 
than one. This results in an increase in the home merger's market share as well. It can be 
shown that, under non-prohibitive tariff levels, aggregate profit in both countries net of 
tariff burden increases in the tariff levels. Therefore, the addition of second and third 
terms has a positive sign unless products are highly differentiated. These two terms 
indicate protection gain, which captures the anti-competitive effect of tariffs. The last 
term, the tariff burden for home firms, lowers the home merger's aggregate profit relative 
to free trade. 
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where 
e q34represents the amount of output exported by a foreign merger. 
Since ) 0 ( = = f h
N
i t t π =) 0 ( = = f h
I
j t t π , relative gain from international mergers 
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Whether
I M  dominates 
N M or not depends on the balance between the tariff 
savings incentive of firms to form international duopoly (
I M ) in order to avoid the tariff 
burden and the protection gain to form national duopoly (
N M ). The former incentive is  22
captured by the first two terms in (3.14), while the latter is captured by the last two terms 
in (3.14). Since we examine unilateral home trade liberalization, our focus is on the first 
term and the third term in the equation (3.14).
18 The balance between the tariff savings 
and the protection gain is characterized in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3.1 Given the foreign tariff ( f t) ,   ) , ( g
j & I
f h t t is a concave function of the 
home tariff ( h t) .  
 
As noted above, the anti-competitive impact of tariff protection increases in the 
home tariff level. For lower home tariffs, the tariff savings dominates the protection gain. 
However, under a very protectionist home trade policy regime, the former effect is 
dominated by the latter. It implies that unilateral home trade liberalization results in an 
increase in the dominance of international duopoly over other market structures for 
higher home tariff levels and a decrease for lower ones. 
It is important to emphasize that the degree of product differentiation is also an 
important determinant of the relative strengths of these two counteracting effects. The 
level of competition among firms is directly affected by the substitutability level (γ ) 
among products. When products are close substitutes, competition is severe and firms are 
close to the Bertrand paradox. In that case, tariff protection provides room for national 
firms to enjoy profits in highly competitive trade environment so that the protection gain 
is more pronounced when substitutability level (γ ) is high. For highly differentiated 
                                                 
18 Note that any dominance function analysis would yield the same results since there is an equal number of 
decisive firms either protected for or against with home tariffs. 
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products, firms have some market power resulting from different characteristics of their 
products so that marginal benefit of tariff protection is relatively low. 
The symmetry of the model implies that same results apply for unilateral foreign 
trade liberalization. Therefore, two extreme foreign tariff levels are taken into 
consideration since the dominance function takes lowest values at these tariff levels and 
this helps us to generalize the result for unilateral trade liberalization. Consider first the 
case that foreign country practices free trade so that  f t =0.
19 Later on, we will also discuss 
the case where foreign country practices very restrictive trade policy regime ( f t =
I t
1 ) in 
order to fully capture the effects of unilateral home trade liberalization. 
 
3.1.2. Free Trade Abroad and Unilateral Trade Liberalization 
Since exporting home firms face a zero tariff abroad, only the tariff savings in the 
home country is relevant and it can arise via an international merger. The following 
characterization of the set of equilibrium market structure (EMS) supports the idea that 
unilateral trade liberalization yields more cross-border mergers when the trading partner 
is a free trade country: 
 
Proposition 3.2 Given that the foreign country practices free trade ) 0 ( = f t,  t h e  
equilibrium market structure (EMS) characterization is as follows:  
i-) International duopoly (
I M ) is the EMS if γ <5.88 for all h t.  
ii-) International duopoly (
I M ) is the EMS if γ >5.88 and < <
N I
cr h t t
& I t
1 . 
                                                 
19 Due to symmetry, analogous results apply for the foreign country.  24
iii-) National duopoly (
N M ) is the EMS if γ >5.88 and  <
N I
cr t






& represents the critical tariff level which equates the aggregate profits 
under national duopoly (
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1  represents the upper limit on the non-prohibitive tariff levels given 
in (3.10). 
 
As it is seen from the above result, the home tariff level ( h t ) and the level of 
substitutability among products (γ ) together act as crucial determinants of the relative 
strengths of the protection gain and the tariff savings. When substitutability level is low, 
there is a little competition among firms since they have some market power stemming 
from different characteristics of their products. Therefore, tariff protection does not have 
a great impact on the demand for home products. Moreover, it can be easily verified that 
the critical tariff level (
N I
cr t
& ) increases in the degree of product differentiation. When 
products are highly differentiated, the critical tariff level (
N I
cr t
& ) exceeds the upper limit 
of non-prohibitive tariff levels (
I t
1 ) so that the tariff savings dominates the protection 
gain for every non-prohibitive tariff levels. As a result, the duopoly market structure with 
international mergers dominates market structures with national mergers. On the other 
hand, when products are close substitutes, product market experiences severe competition 
that makes the protection gain more decisive in determining industry structure. Combined  25
with high substitutability levels, protective home trade policy regime gives firms more 
incentives to form national mergers. 
Moreover, the equilibrium set of market structures is non-empty for all non-
prohibitive tariff levels irrespective of the degree of product differentiation. In this sense, 
the model is well behaved.
20 This pattern of market structures yields the result that as the 
home country gets unilaterally liberalized, given that the foreign country practices free 
trade, international mergers become the mode of industry structure. 
The next question is what if the foreign country uses very restrictive trade 
protection. In other words, next section tries to answer the same question as in the 
Proposition 2 under a more protectionist trade environment. 
 
3.1.3. Restrictive Trade Policy Abroad and Unilateral Trade Liberalization 
Recall that concavity of the function called relative gain from international 
mergers indicates that it is minimized at two limit points first of which was discussed in 
the previous section. Now suppose that the tariff level in the foreign country is very high: 
 





1  is the upper limit of non-prohibitive tariff levels. 
This assumption makes the trade environment more protectionists so that the 
protection gain is expected to dominate the tariff savings on a broader range of tariff and 
substitutability levels. Intuitively, extra profits needed to transfer to foreign firms in order 
to convince them to get involved in an international merger depend not only on the home 
                                                 
20 As it has been shown in Horn and Persson (2000), the number of firms is immaterial to the result. 
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tariff level but also on the substitutability levels. Equilibrium characterization represents 
the balance between these two determinants: 
Proposition 3.3 Given that the foreign country practices restrictive trade ( f t=
I t
1 ), the 
equilibrium market structure (EMS) characterization is as follows:  
i-) International duopoly (
I M ) is the EMS if γ <5.88 for all h t.  
ii-) International duopoly (








1 < < . 
iii-) National duopoly (
N M ) is the EMS if 8.06>γ >5.88 and 
N I
cr h t t
&





2 < h t
I t
1 . 
iv-) National duopoly (









2 are critical home tariff levels which equate the aggregate 
profits under national duopoly (
N M ) and international duopoly (
I M ) so that firms are 
indifferent between these two market structures. 
 
There are several significant insights provided by this proposition. Our first 
observation is that, as under free trade, the set of equilibrium market structures is non-
empty for every tariff and substitutability levels. 
Second, in comparison to the case where the foreign country practices free trade, 
a more protectionist trade environment induces firms to merge nationally unless products 
are highly differentiated. When product substitutability is low, weak competition yields 
greater tariff savings through international merger than the protection gain, which arises 
due to a national merger. It is a result of the fact that the anti-competitive effects of tariff 
protection is less important since firms already have market power stemming from  27
product differentiation. Therefore, duopoly with two international mergers survives as the 
dominant market structure for all home tariff levels when products are highly 
differentiated. 
For intermediate substitutability levels, the equilibrium characterization is more 
complicated: relatively high and low home tariff levels result in a national duopoly as the 
equilibrium market structure. Intuitively, since the tariff level is very restrictive in the 
foreign country and kept fixed within the unilateral home trade liberalization process, 
home firms are ready to transfer a larger share of profits to foreign firms to form an 
international merger if the protection in the home country is not very high. However, at 
the same time, as the home tariff level falls too much and substitutability level increases, 
it becomes harder to convince foreign firms to give up the protection gain and get 
involved in an international merger since the tariff savings incentives of foreign firms fall 
and the protection gain rises even further. On the other hand, when the home country's 
trade policy is restrictive as in the foreign country, it creates a very protective trade 
environment encouraging national market structures. When products are close substitutes, 
national duopoly becomes the only equilibrium market structure irrespective of home 
tariff levels. This is because it is no longer possible to convince foreign firms to form 
international merger since the difference between the protection gain and the tariff 
savings is greater than what home firms are able to offer for any home tariff levels. 
If these two extreme foreign trade policy cases are compared, the biggest 
difference occurs when the products are relatively close substitutes. Different trade policy 
regimes in the rival country reverse the effects of unilateral trade liberalization. A liberal 
trade environment in the foreign country yields the result that unilateral home trade  28
liberalization induces firms to form international market structure irrespective of the 
degree of product differentiation. However, if foreign country practices very restrictive 
trade policy, national ownership structure happens to be equilibrium when products are 
close substitutes. 
Given these unilateral incentives, it is natural to ask: What are the effects of 
bilateral trade liberalization on industry restructuring? This interaction is examined next. 
 
3.2. Bilateral Trade Liberalization 
The effects of bilateral trade liberalization on the equilibrium market structure can 
be examined by assuming a common exogenous tariff level  ) ( t t t f h = =  in both markets 
and then lowering it. The difference from the case of unilateral trade liberalization is that 
the reduction in tariffs is realized in both markets so that both the tariff savings and the 
protection gain from tariffs decline. Because of market segmentation, the same 
prohibitive tariff levels are valid in both markets so that the upper limit of tariff levels is 
again
I t
1 . In order to identify forces, which have impacts on the ranking of market 
structures, we can compare aggregate profits under international and national duopolies 
(
I M  and
N M ) as in (3.14) by replacing home and foreign tariffs ( h t  and f t ) by a 
common tariff (t). The following result supports the idea that cross border mergers 
become a major mode of industry restructuring following bilateral trade liberalization: 
 
Proposition 3.4 Given that the home and foreign tariff levels are equal to t 
(t t t f h = = =), the set of the equilibrium market structure (EMS) is as follows:  
i-) International duopoly (
I M ) is the EMS if γ <5.88 for allt.  29
ii-) International duopoly (
I M ) is the EMS if γ >5.88 and
N I
cr h t t
& < . 
iii-) National duopoly (









& represents critical tariff level which makes decisive firms indifferent 
between the national duopoly (
N M ) and international duopoly (
I M ). 
 
This proposition points to two important features. First, the set of the equilibrium 
market structures is non-empty for almost all tariff levels. The only exception occurs 
when substitutability levels (γ ) are in the intermediate range and trade policy is 
restrictive. The intransitiveness of the dominance relationship becomes important for this 





1 ). It can be 
shown that 
N M  dominates 
i M  where i=O, H, F, I in this given region. But it is also the 
case that, for the same region, 
N M is dominated by 
I M
1 which is dominated by 
I M for 
all tariff and substitutability levels. Therefore, there is no equilibrium market structure in 
this region.  
Secondly, the proposition seems to provide the opposite intuition to the tariff 
jumping argument in the FDI literature since higher protection yields nationally 
concentrated firms for close substitutes. This counterintuitive result is due to the 
endogeneity of the merger formation model. In the FDI literature, the tariff jumping 
argument is made for a single firm by focusing on two alternatives: export or FDI. These 
two options are compared under trade policy regime without changing the concentration 
level in the market. However it is important to note that, using the model specified in this 
paper, FDI occurs via an international merger and all decisive firms involved in the  30
merger formation process benefit from tariff savings and lose from tariff protection in 
their domestic markets. In the FDI literature, on the other hand, firms investing in the 
foreign country directly enjoy tariff savings without losing their gains from protection. 
Actually, if one focuses on a single concentrative international merger, similar 
ideas in the FDI literature can be captured within this model as well. For instance, there 
are two decisive owners between market structures 
O M  and
I M
1 . These decisive owners 
save on tariffs via an international merger which is the dominant form of FDI. To 
understand the incentives to form an international merger (or to do FDI), the profit of 
nationally exporting firm under 
O M can be compared with the profit of the 
internationally merging firm under
I M
1 . To this end, the following incentive function can 
be defined: 
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It can be easily verified that this incentive function is monotonically increasing in 








                                                 (3.16) 
However the approach used in this paper is more general than the one employed 
above since it can be applied to situations with more than one concentrative merger and 
all feasible market structures can be compared with each other through dominance 
relationships. Given these differences between approaches, the counterintuitive result  31
stems from the tension between the tariff savings and the protection gain of decisive 
firms in the merger formation process. 
 
3.4. Welfare Implications and Merger Policy 
Throughout the paper, we assume that very concentrated market structures are 
excluded by setting an upper limit on HHI. An important question is whether the 
equilibrium market structures found above are the ones that are preferable from a welfare 
point of view or not. A country's aggregate welfare is defined as the sum of its consumer 











j TR PS CS W + + =  where i = O, H, F, 1I, I, N and j = h (HC), f (FC) 
Even though no specific payoff division in any merger is assumed, since the 
feasible market structures are completely symmetric from welfare point of view 
when f h t t = , it is reasonable to assume that profits are evenly divided between merging 
firms. 
We can identify several forces that impact the welfare ranking of different market 
structures. First, as in the closed economy, there is standard trade-off between the impact 
of concentration on producer surplus and consumer welfare. In the open economy, part of 
the cost of domestic concentration is transmitted to foreign consumers. Second, domestic 
tariffs protect national firms in the domestic country whereas foreign tariffs punish them 
in the export market. Moreover, consumer welfare decreases in tariffs. Note that this 
                                                 
21 Welfare ranking of different market structures is examined only for the home country. Due to the 
symmetry, same analysis will follow for the foreign country.  32
second source of tension vanishes completely under a duopoly with two international 
mergers and partly under a triopoly with one international merger. Third, under 
asymmetric market structures (
H M ,
F M , and
I M
1 ), a merger confers a large positive 
externality (free rider effect) on competing firms. The degree of the free rider effect can 
be measured by the amount by which the profits of a non-merging firm increase when a 
merger happens. As in Davidson and Deneckere (1985), the free rider effect of a merger 












12 π . Similarly, under the triopoly with one international 
merger (
I M
1 ), merging firms enjoy free rider effect that arises due to tariffs national 
competing firms face.  
We first examine the case when the tariff rates are low. Under a relatively liberal 
trade environment, the anti-competitive effect of trade policy on consumer welfare and 
producer surplus is not very important from a welfare point of view. Also, when the level 
of product substitutability is low, the free rider effect under asymmetric market structures 
is not strong. Thus, in such a situation, the most important concern is the anti-competitive 
effect of market concentration on consumer welfare and producer surplus. As expected, 
the least concentrated market structure (
O M ) is the most preferred market structure when 
products are highly differentiated. For close substitutes, however, there is a severe 
competition among firms so that the free rider effect of a foreign merger to home 
competing firms tips the balance in favor of the triopoly with foreign merger (
F M ). 
As the tariff level increases, the tariff savings of international mergers get more 
pronounced as do the anti-competitive effect of the trade policy on consumer welfare. For 
intermediate range of tariff levels, the free rider effect under international triopoly (
I M
1 )  33
is the main reason why 
I M
1  is the most preferred market structure. When trade policy is 
restrictive, the duopoly with two international mergers (
I M ) is the most preferred market 
structure for all substitutability levels. Note that even though consumers lose from 
concentration and there is no tariff revenue, the tariff savings dominate the other 
counteracting effects. 
Having identified the welfare ranking of different market structures, we now 
come to the second important question: Among equilibrium market structures (
I M  and 
N M ), which one is the most preferable from a welfare point of view? The following 
result is immediate: 
 
Proposition 3.5 Given that the home and foreign tariff levels are equal to t ( t t t f h = = ), 
the duopoly with two international mergers (
I M ) yields higher national and world 
welfare than the duopoly with two national mergers (
N M ) for all tariff and 
substitutability levels. 
 
Since competition policy is assumed to allow two mergers consisting of two 
firms, firms' incentives are binding in this set-up. Given the above equilibrium market 
structures, it is clear that the duopoly with two international mergers (
I M ) yields the 
same welfare level as the duopoly with two national mergers (
N M ) when both countries 
practice free trade ( 0 = = f h t t ): 
 
 ) 0 ( ) 0 ( ) 0 ( = + = = = = t PS t CS t W W
N I                                 (3.17)  34
In order to rank these two market structures from a welfare point of view, we use 
differential techniques. The welfare under the duopoly with two national mergers (
N M ) 
can be expressed as follows: 
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where ) (
i e q q  represents the amount of output exported (imported) by a national 
merger. 
Equation (3.18) decomposes the welfare under 
N M  into six terms. The sum of 
the first and third components is the aggregate welfare when both countries practice free 
trade. The second and fourth terms measure the anti-competitive effect of the trade policy 
on consumer surplus and producer surplus (net of tariff payment) respectively. Last two 
terms measure the tariff payments on exports and tariff revenue, which arises due to 
imports. 
As noted above, there is a complete symmetry under these two market structures 
(
I M  and
N M ) and same tariff level ( t t t f h = = ) is assumed in two markets. Therefore, 
tariff payments and tariff revenue are identical: 
 
i e tq tq =                                                       (3.19) 
Using the equations (3.17), (3.18), (3.19), we can compare the welfare level under 
I M  and
N M  as follows: 
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) (                              (3.20) 
First term in equation (3.20) measures the decrease in consumer welfare due to 
trade protection relative to free trade. Since prices increase due to tariffs, the first term 
has a negative sign. The second term, on the other hand, measures the change in 
aggregate profits net of tariff payment relative to a situation in which both countries 
practice free trade. As noted earlier, the second term has a positive sign unless products 
are highly differentiated. Thus, the welfare ranking of equilibrium market structures 
depends on the balance between the anti-competitive effect of the trade protection on the 
consumer welfare and producer surplus. Given the demand function in our model, the 
former effect dominates the latter so that 
I M  dominates
N M in terms of welfare for all 
substitutability and tariff levels: 
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Note that due to the symmetry of these two market structures, analogous results 
apply for the world welfare. The above welfare analysis points out that there is scope for 
welfare-enhancing merger policies. Along the line of the literature investigating 
international linkages between trade and merger policies, a frequent concern has been the 
possibility that trade liberalization may induce countries to use more lax competition 
policies, in narrower sense merger policies, to promote national interests at the expense 
of others. Incentives for a welfare maximizing government to make such a substitution 
can be examined by interpreting merger policy as a choice of degree of industrial  36
concentration.
22 Competition authorities have the ability to impact resulting equilibrium 
market structure characterization through merger policies specified in the merger 
guidelines.
23 Suppose that they can choose an upper limit of concentration level above 
which any merger proposal is blocked. The equilibrium market structure characterization 
in Proposition 4 and the above welfare ranking together imply that competition 
authorities have less incentive to block merger as trade gets liberalized if a duopoly of 
two mergers are permitted. Trade liberalization induces more cross border ownerships 
(
I M ), which results in higher welfare than national market structures (
N M ). In other 
words, social and private incentives converge to each other as trade gets bilaterally 
liberalized. 
Next question is related with the equilibrium market structures under optimal 
tariff levels. To this end, one more step will be added to the original game employed so 
far in order to endogenize trade policy as well.
24 
 
3.5. Endogenous Trade Policy 
Thus far, our analysis does not recognize the fact that trade policy in each country 
may respond to changes in market structure. To allow for this interaction, consider the 
following game. In the first stage, firm owners decide on the merger formation so that 
industry structure is determined. Next, each country chooses a specific tariff t on imports. 
In the last stage, firms compete in prices in the product market. 
                                                 
22 This question is addressed in Richardson (1999), Horn and Levinsohn (2000), Saggi and Yildiz (2002). 
 
23 In the Horizontal Merger Guideline (1997), in part 1.43 it is indicated that market shares will be assigned 
to foreign competitors in the same way in which they are assigned to domestic competitors. 
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Each country chooses its tariff to maximize its welfare. The tariff ranking shows 
that as the market gets more concentrated nationally, higher tariff is imposed on the 
imports. The optimal tariff rate decreases in the number of international mergers so that 

















1 *  for γ  >4.16                                    (3.21) 















1 *  for γ  <4.16                                    (3.22) 
This result argues that the interaction between the level of protection and the 
industry concentration depends on the nature of the mergers (national or international).
26 
Moreover, among national triopolies, the impact of the concentration of domestic 
firms on the optimal tariff is greater for high substitutability levels relative to the impact 
of concentration of foreign firms. This is because the protection gain increases with the 
degree of product substitutability. 
Having ranked the optimal tariff rates, two immediate questions are: When 
countries can respond to mergers via optimal tariffs, what is the set of equilibrium market 
structures? Among these market structures, which are the ones that are preferred from a 
welfare point of view? 
The following proposition is immediate: 
                                                 
25 It is clear that international duopoly inherently excludes tariff level in this model. 
 
26 There are number of empirical studies that explore the interaction between the industry concentration and 
the level of protection. The results are inconclusive. Whereas Trefler (1993), Gawande (1997), and 
Bandyopadhyay and Gawande (2000) found significant positive relationships between industry 
concentration and the level of protection, Baldwin (1985), and Anderson and Baldwin (1987) report a 
negative relationship. The present paper provides one explanation for this ambiguity in the sense that the 
nature of the concentration (national or international) is important in determining optimal trade policy. 
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Proposition 6 Under optimal trade policy: 
i-) International duopoly (
I M ) is the equilibrium market structure if γ <8.72. 
ii-) National duopoly (
N M ) is the equilibrium market structure if γ >8.72. 
iii-) International duopoly (
I M ) is the most preferred market structure from a 
welfare point of view for all substitutability levels (γ ). 
 
In terms of equilibrium market structures, optimal trade policy regime yields 
results similar to those obtained in our analysis of unilateral and bilateral trade 
liberalization. The first two parts of proposition 6 states that the protection gain 
dominates the tariff savings for close substitutes and vice versa if products are 
differentiated enough. Therefore, the equilibrium market structure is the duopoly with 
two national mergers (
N M ) for higher substitutability levels and the duopoly with two 
international mergers (
I M ) for lower ones.   
Allowing for endogenous trade policy yields the duopoly with two international 
mergers (
I M ) as the most preferred market structure from a welfare point of view for all 
substitutability levels. Since the optimal tariff levels change with the concentration of the 
industry, less concentrated market structures are dominated by the duopoly with two 
international mergers (
I M ) in terms of welfare. One can easily confirm this result by 
using figure 4 since the lowest optimal tariff rate falls to the area where the duopoly with 
two international mergers (
I M ) is the most preferred market structure. Whether optimal 
trade policy regime is welfare-enhancing or not depends on the substitutability level 
among products. For very close substitutes, optimal trade policy responses result in the  39
least desired market structure (
N M ) as the equilibrium market structure. When the 
products are differentiated enough, private and social incentives tend to move together. 
 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper explores the international linkages between industry structure and trade 
liberalization. The objective has been to ask how industry restructures following trade 
liberalization. This is a meaningful question because over the last two decades the world 
economy has experienced the largest ever merger movement with a high incidence of 
cross border mergers and acquisitions. Despite the increase in cross-border M&A's, the 
literature on international trade and FDI has paid little attention to this phenomenon. 
The model endogenizes merger formation under price competition in an 
international oligopolistic market. We explore firms' incentives to form cross-border 
mergers and show that two effects play an important role in merger formation: protection 
gain and tariff savings. The former effect represents the anti-competitive impact of trade 
policy, which arises when firms are national whereas the latter captures the incentives to 
avoid trade costs via an international merger. An analysis of these two effects shows that 
the tariff level and the degree of product differentiation together create a trade-off 
between the relative attractiveness of national and international market structures to 
firms. 
We find that when products are close substitutes, different trade policy regimes in the 
foreign country can reverse the effects of unilateral home trade liberalization. 
Furthermore, under bilateral trade liberalization, the tariff reduction is realized in both 
markets so that both the tariff savings and the protection gain are lower relative to  40
unilateral trade liberalization. Our main result is that, as trade gets bilaterally liberalized, 
the resulting equilibrium market structure is the one with international merger. This result 
fits well with the fact that global trade liberalization has been accompanied by an increase 
in international merger activity. 
From a welfare perspective, international mergers are found to be preferable to 
national mergers due to the fact that they help avoid trade costs. This result provides 
support for the idea that there is scope for welfare-enhancing merger policies under a 
liberal trade environment. Interpreting merger policy as the choice of industrial 
concentration, we show that social and private incentives become aligned together as 
trade gets liberalized. 
Following trade liberalization, other aspects of economic policy that are not 
harmonized have begun to receive more attention. The reduction in tariff rates has raised 
the issue of harmonization of competition policies. In policy making, national mergers 
are often viewed differently from cross-border mergers. Even though this study does not 
model harmonization explicitly, this discrimination can be captured simply through 
different fixed regulation fees imposed on national and international mergers. We intend 
to pursue this in future research.  41
5. Appendix 
All supporting calculations not provided in text are given below. 
Proof of Corollary 3.1 
Prohibitive tariff level under a given Market structure equates the equilibrium 
quantity to zero. They are found as follows: 
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Proof of proposition 3.1 
Concavity of dominance function is satisfied by second order differentiation: 
a) 
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Proof of proposition 3.2 
Since the dominance relationship is one sided, it is sufficient to show that 
I M  
and 
N M  dominate all other market structures in the specified region of tariff and 
substitutability levels. It implies that these market structures are undominated in this 
region as well. Consider the first two parts of the proposition: 
a) 
I M  dominates 
O M for all  h t and γ . 
Since there are two completely symmetric groups of decisive firms, there are two 
symmetric dominance functions. It is easy to verify that: 
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b) 
I M dominates 
H M  if   8 . 20 < γ  for all  h t .  
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cr t
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the tariff level that equates  ) 0 ( ,
& = f h
H I t t d to zero. The decisive group comprises all 
owners. Total industry profit is compared under these two market structures. 
c) 
I M dominates 
F M for all  h t and γ . 
The decisive group comprises all owners. Total industry profit is compared under 
these two market structures. 
d) 
I M dominates 
I M
1 for all  h t and γ . 
                  The decisive group comprises two owners. 
e) 
I M dominates 
N M  if   88 . 5 < γ  for all  h t .   44
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The decisive group comprises all owners. Industry profit is compared under these 
two market structures. 
To complete the first two parts of the proposition we need to compare 
N I
cr t
&  and 
H I
cr t







&  for all 0 > γ  
Combining a, b, c, d, e and 21, it is trivial to show that: 
Given that 0 = f t , the equilibrium market structure is: 
i. 
I M  if   88 . 5 < γ  for all  h t .  
ii. 
I M  if   88 . 5 > γ  and for 
N I
cr h t t
& < . 
Now consider the last part of the proposition: 
f) 
N M  dominates 
O M  for all   h t  and γ . 
Since there are two completely symmetric decisive groups comprising two 
owners, there are two symmetric dominance functions. It is easy to verify that: 
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g) 
N M  dominates 
H M  ) (
F M for all   h t  and γ . 
The decisive group comprises all owners. Total industry profit is compared under 
these two market structures. 
This completes the proof of the last part and thus proof of Proposition 3.2. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3.3 
Same procedure is applied as in the proof of proposition 3.2. consider the first part 
of the proposition: 
a) 
I M  dominates 
O M  if   02 . 18 < γ  for all  h t .  
    
I M  dominates 
O M   if   02 . 18 > γ  for all 
O I
cr h t t
& < . 
 
O M  dominates 
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O I
cr h
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O I t t t d = to zero. Since there are two completely 
symmetric groups of decisive owners, there are two symmetric dominance functions: 
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H I t t t d = to zero. The decisive group comprises all owners. 
Total industry profit is compared under these two market structures. 
c) 
I M dominates 
F M  if   66 . 8 < γ  for all  h t .   46
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F I t t t d = to zero. The decisive group comprises all owners. 
Total industry profit is compared under these two market structures. 
d) 
I M dominates 
I M
1  for all   h t  and γ . 
The decisive group comprises all owners. 
e) 
I M dominates 
N M  if   88 . 5 < γ  for all  h t .  
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2  are critical the tariff levels that equate the industry profit under 
N M and
I M . 
The decisive group comprises all owners. Total industry profit is compared under these 
two market structures: 
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Next step is to show that 
N M dominates all possible market structures other than 
I M  for every substitutability and tariff levels. 
f) 
N M dominates 
O M  for all   h t  and γ . 
Since there are two completely symmetric decisive groups comprising two 
owners, there are two symmetric dominance functions. It is easy to verify that: 
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NO O πππ >+ and  34 3 4
NO O πππ >+ for all 
I
h t t
1 <   47
g) 
N M dominates 
H M (
F M ) for all   h t  and γ . 
The decisive group comprises two owners. Tariff level can be seen as a constant 
marginal cost. In this dominance relationship, movement from
H M  to 
N M implies a 
single concentrative merger which is always profitable under price competition. 
h) 
N M dominates 
I M
1  for all   h t  and γ . 
The decisive group comprises all owners. Total industry profit is compared under 
these two market structures. 
This completes the proof of the last part and thus the proof of Proposition 3.3. 
Proof of Proposition 3.4 
a) 
I M  dominates 
O M  if   02 . 18 < γ  for all t.  
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O I to zero. Since there are two completely symmetric groups 
of decisive owners, there are two symmetric dominance functions: 
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b) 
I M  dominates 
H M (
F M ) if   66 . 8 < γ  for all t.  
    
I M  dominates 
H M  (
F M )if   66 . 8 > γ  for all 
H I
cr t t
& < . 
    
H M (
F M ) dominates 
I M  if   66 . 8 > γ  for  
H I
cr
I t t t
& 1 > >  where 
H I
cr t
&  is the 
tariff level that equates  ) (
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H I to zero. The decisive group comprises all owners. 
Industry profit is compared under these two market structures.  48
c) 
I M dominates 
I M
1  for all  t and γ . 
The decisive group comprises two owners. 
d) 
I M dominates 
N M  if   88 . 5 < γ  for all t.  
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N M  if   88 . 5 > γ  for all 
N I
cr t t
& < . 
    
N M dominates 
I M  if  88 . 5 > γ  for all 
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& 1 > > . 
The decisive group comprises all owners. Industry profit is compared under these 
two market structures. Dominance function is as the following: 
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Next step is to show that 
N M dominates all possible market structures other than 
I M for the region specified in the proposition: 
e) 
N M  dominates 
O M  for all  t and γ  values: 
Since there are two completely symmetric groups comprising two owners, there 
are two symmetric dominance functions: 
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NO O πππ >+ and  34 3 4
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f) 
N M dominates 
H M (
F M ) for all t and γ .  49
The decisive group comprises two owners. Tariff level can be seen as a constant 
marginal cost. In this dominance relationship, movement from 
H M to 
N M implies a 
single concentrative merger which is always profitable under price competition. 
g) 
N M dominates 
I M
1  if  123 . 7 > γ for all t. 
    
I M
1  dominates 
N M  if   88 . 5 123 . 7 > > γ  for  
I I N
cr t t t
1 1 & < <  where 
I N
cr t
1 &  is 
the tariff level that equates  ) (
1 & t d
I N to zero. The decisive group comprises all owners. 
Total industry profit is compared under these two market structures. 
This completes the proof of the last part and thus the proof of proposition 3.4. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3.6 
Under each market structure, optimal tariff levels are follows: 
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Given these optimal tariff levels: 
a) 
I M  dominates 
O M and
I M
1  for all γ .  50
b) 
I M  dominates 
H M and
F M  if  . 6 . 30 < γ  
c) 
I M  dominates 
N M if  72 . 8 < γ . 
Industry profits under these two duopoly market structures (
N M and 
I M ) are 
compared as follows: 
2 2 2
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d) 
N M  dominates
O M , 
H M and
F M  for all γ . 
e) 
N M  dominates 
I M
1  if  73 . 4 > γ . 
As a result, equilibrium market structure (EMS) under optimal tariffs is: 
The EMS is 
I M  if  72 . 8 < γ , and 
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